By Matthews Otalike
The Economic Community of West African States, (ECOWAS), a regional bloc comprising 15 member states is facing a number of challenges concerning it’s role in Burkina Faso. This is in the context of the alleged coup attempt against Captain Ibrahim Traoré, General Michael E. Langley’s AFRICOM statements, and the broader geopolitical dynamics involving Russia and regional allies.
The military coup in Burkina Faso in 2022 led by Captain Ibrahim Traoré and the country’s subsequent withdrawal from ECOWAS in January 2025 has brought some challenges to the organization.
Traoré’s military government, alongside those of Mali and Niger, formed the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), thereby rejecting ECOWAS’s authority and aligning with Russia.
Amid allegations of a foiled coup attempt in April 2025 involving 106 arrests and General Michael E. Langley’s critical remarks about Traoré’s governance, ECOWAS’s role has been scrutinized for its response or lack thereof of it, to Burkina Faso’s political and security crises.
The Searchlight, in this analysis, explores ECOWAS’s actions, limitations, and motivations and regional dynamics to assess its influence in Burkina Faso.
ECOWAS’s Response to Burkina Faso’s Political Crisis
ECOWAS has historically intervened in member states’ political crises through sanctions, mediation, or military action to restore constitutional order, as it did in Gambia (2017) and Mali (2020). However, its response to Burkina Faso’s 2022 coup and subsequent developments has been markedly constrained:
Initial Reaction to the 2022 Coup.
Following Traoré’s coup, ECOWAS suspended Burkina Faso from its decision-making bodies, as it did with Mali and Niger after their coups. The bloc imposed sanctions, including border closures and economic restrictions, to pressure the junta to restore democratic governance. However, these measures proved ineffective, as Burkina Faso’s junta prioritized national sovereignty and resource control, particularly over its $4 billion gold reserves.
Withdrawal from ECOWAS
On January 29, 2025, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger formalized their withdrawal from ECOWAS, citing the bloc’s “inhumane” sanctions and alignment with Western interests, particularly France and the U.S.. ECOWAS urged dialogue and reconciliation before the withdrawal, emphasizing the economic and security risks of fragmentation, but failed to prevent the exit.
The formation of the AES signaled a rejection of ECOWAS’s authority, and weakening its regional influence.
Response to the Alleged Coup Attempt:
The announcement by the Burkinabè on April 21, 2025, of a foiled coup plot involving 106 arrests, allegedly orchestrated from Ivory Coast, has placed ECOWAS in a delicate position. Ivory Coast, a key ECOWAS member and U.S./French ally, denied involvement, and ECOWAS has not issued any public statement directly addressing the coup allegations. This silence likely reflects the bloc’s diminished leverage over Burkina Faso and its reluctance to escalate tensions with the AES, which could further fracture West African unity.
In April, ECOWAS held an extraordinary Council of Ministers meeting in Ghana to address the AES’s withdrawal and its implications for regional stability. The bloc expressed concern over Burkina Faso’s political situation but prioritized dialogue over confrontation, acknowledging its limited ability to enforce compliance from non-members.
An X post by @ecowas_cedeao on February 24, 2024, highlighted ECOWAS President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s call for dialogue at an earlier summit, underscoring ECOWAS’s preference for negotiation over punitive measures.
A critical examination of ECOWAS’s role in Burkina Faso appears to have been hampered by a number of factors. One of them is that the AES’s exit from ECOWAS, announced in January 2024 and effective in 2025, stripped the bloc of formal authority over Burkina Faso.
This withdrawal, described as a “geopolitical earthquake” by The Conversation (an online medium), disrupted trade, mobility, and security cooperation, with Burkina Faso’s economy facing potential losses due to severed ECOWAS trade benefits.
ECOWAS’s inability to reverse this decision highlights its weakened regional clout.
Another factor is Burkina Faso’s ongoing jihadist insurgency, which has displaced over 2 million people and killed thousands in 2025. It has exposed ECOWAS’s limited capacity to address security threats. The major goal of the AES’s formation is to assert sovereignty and having to contend with instability due to unchecked insurgencies. ECOWAS past reliance on French and U.S. military support, such as Operation Serval, contrasts with the AES’s Russian alignment, complicating regional security coordination.
The third challenge is the ECOWAS perceived western bias which Traoré’s government and its supporters, amplified by X posts like @Joe__Bassey’s, accuse ECOWAS of serving as a Western proxy, particularly for France and the U.S. This perception, rooted in ECOWAS’s historical alignment with Western powers and its sanctions on military-led states, has fueled anti-ECOWAS sentiment in Burkina Faso. The bloc’s failure to counter this narrative has eroded its legitimacy among pan-Africanist movements.
ECOWAS’s member states are divided on how to handle the AES. Pro-Western members like Ivory Coast and Nigeria advocate for engagement with the U.S. and France, while others, like Ghana, host pro-Traoré rallies, reflecting sympathy for his anti-colonial stance. This fragmentation, noted in International Banker, undermines ECOWAS’s ability to present a unified front.
Russia’s Role and ECOWAS’s Dilemma
Russia’s growing influence in Burkina Faso has further marginalized ECOWAS. Traoré’s May 2025 meeting with Vladimir Putin has secured Russian military support, including Africa Corps (formerly Wagner) personnel, in exchange for gold concessions. X posts, such as @SeptusUncius’s claim that Russian-backed coups in Burkina Faso enabled gold extraction to fund the Ukraine war, highlight Moscow’s strategic interests. Russia’s alleged disinformation campaigns, as reported by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, amplify Traoré’s anti-Western rhetoric, framing ECOWAS as a tool of neocolonialism.
The dilemma of ECOWAS is the possibility of confronting the AES thereby escalating tensions and pushing Burkina Faso further into Russia’s orbit, while inaction undermines its credibility. The ECOWAS’s silence on the April 2025 coup allegations may reflect a strategic choice to avoid antagonizing the AES, given Ivory Coast’s implicated role as an ECOWAS member.
Regional Allies and Dynamics
The AES member states, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, have emerged as a counterweight to ECOWAS, with Mali and Niger publicly supporting Traoré against American General Langley’s criticisms.
Rallies in Bamako and Niamey, alongside those in Ghana and Liberia, underscore regional solidarity with Traoré’s pan-Africanist agenda. However, this support does not appear universal.
As a key ECOWAS member and host of AFRICOM engagements, Ivory Coast’s alleged role in the coup plot has strained relations with Burkina Faso. Its denial of involvement, backed by ECOWAS’s silence, suggests an effort to de-escalate tensions.
On her part, despite hosting pro-Traoré rallies, Ghana remains a committed ECOWAS member, hosting the April 2025 ministerial meeting to address the AES’s withdrawal. This dual stance reflects Ghana’s balancing act between regional unity and sympathy for anti-Western sentiments. As ECOWAS’s chair, Nigeria has pushed for dialogue but faces challenges in mediating with the AES, given its pro-Western alignment.
ECOWAS’s diminished influence over Burkina Faso contrasts with the AES’s growing cohesion, though the latter’s reliance on Russian support and failure to curb jihadist violence raise questions about its sustainability.
Critical Evaluation of ECOWAS’s Role
ECOWAS’s calls for dialogue, as seen in X posts from 2024, have failed to bring Burkina Faso back into the fold, reflecting its inability to address the junta’s grievances over sanctions and perceived Western bias. The bloc’s focus on constitutional restoration clashes with Traoré’s prioritization of sovereignty and resource control.
Secondly, ECOWAS’s inability to address Burkina Faso’s jihadist crisis, which controls 40% of the country’s territory, undermines its security mandate. The bloc’s reliance on Western partners, now rejected by the AES, has left it sidelined.
Thirdly, the U.S. and France’s influence over ECOWAS, evident in Langley’s Ivory Coast visit, fuels perceptions of the bloc as a Western tool. This complicates its role in Burkina Faso, where anti-Western sentiment is strong.
And ECOWAS’s silence on the 106 arrests for attempts to remove Traore, suggests caution to avoid escalating tensions with the AES or implicating Ivory Coast. Without evidence of the detainees’ origins, the coup plot may serve Traoré’s narrative to discredit ECOWAS and rally domestic support.
Conclusion
ECOWAS’s role in Burkina Faso in 2025 has been severely curtailed by the country’s withdrawal from the bloc, the AES’s formation, and Traoré’s alignment with Russia. The bloc’s attempts at mediation and sanctions have failed to influence the junta, while its silence on the alleged April 2025 coup attempt reflects its weakened position and fear of further regional fragmentation.
Russia’s growing influence and the AES’s defiance have sidelined ECOWAS, exposing its reliance on Western partners and internal divisions among members like Ivory Coast and Nigeria. X posts highlight strong anti-ECOWAS sentiment, driven by perceptions of Western bias, but lack evidence of a direct U.S.-ECOWAS plot against Traoré.
This analysis underscores ECOWAS’s struggle to remain relevant in a shifting Sahel, urging the bloc to prioritize inclusive dialogue and address the root causes of Burkina Faso’s discontent to restore its regional authority.
Matthews Otalike is the Publisher of The Searchlight
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